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1. This Note’s final draft was written before the publication of Joanna 
Schwartz’s recent article demonstrating how qualified immunity may 
not be as large of an obstacle as formerly believed, arguing that the 
Supreme Court incorrectly balanced interests in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
and exploring the re-incorporation of the subjective prong that existed 
before Harlow as a possible solution. Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified 
Immunity Fails, 127 Yale L.J. 2 (2017). I did not read Schwartz’s 
Article while conceptualizing and organizing this Note, nor use any 
analysis from Schwartz’s Article in writing this Note. 
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Introduction 
On July 6, 2016, Philando Castile was killed by a police officer in 
St. Paul, Minnesota during a traffic stop for a broken tail light.2 Once 
pulled over, Castile told the officer that he had a firearm on him.3 The 
officer asked him not to reach for it, and Castile said he was not. 
Nevertheless, the officer shot Castile. Castile’s girlfriend, Diamond 
Reynolds, immediately began streaming the aftermath on Facebook.4 
As Castile slumped in his seat, his shirt soaked in blood, Reynolds 
stated, “You shot four bullets into him, sir. He was just getting his 
license and registration, sir.”5 The officer later claimed that he “feared 
for his life.”6 The city settled a lawsuit filed against it by Castile’s 
2. Camila Domonoske & Bill Chappell, Minnesota Gov. Calls Traffic Stop 
Shooting ‘Absolutely Appalling at All Levels’, NPR (Jul. 7, 2016, 7:19 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/07/07/485066807/police-
stop-ends-in-black-mans-death-aftermath-is-livestreamed-online-video [https:
 //perma.cc/P7MA-RCHY].
3. Dash Camera Shows Moment Philando Castile Is Shot, N.Y. Times (Jun. 
20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/100000005176538/dash-
camera-shows-moment-philando-castile-is-killed.html [https://perma.cc/3M 
QN-4W8B].
4. Id.
5. Philando Castile Death: Aftermath of Police Shooting Streamed Live, 
BBC (Jul. 7, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-367 
32908 [https://perma.cc/S6FL-FS24].
6. Mark Berman, What the Police Officer Who Shot Philando Castile Said 
About the Shooting, Wash. Post (Jun. 21, 2017), https://www.washington 
post.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/06/21/what-the-police-officer-who-
shot-philando-castile-said-about-the-shooting/?utm_term=.ab2f31f30319 
[https://perma.cc/7T4B-Y5PY]. 
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family 10 days after a jury acquitted the officer of all charges in the 
shooting.7 
On March 13, 2009, Jamie Lockard was pulled over for traffic 
violations in Lawrenceburg, Indiana, and the officer, upon talking to 
Lockard, believed Lockard was intoxicated.8 Lockard registered a 
blood alcohol concentration of 0.07% and refused to submit to a 
chemical test.9 The officer obtained a search warrant to gather a blood 
and urine sample from Lockard.10 The blood sample was obtained 
without any problem, but Lockard was unable to provide a urine sam-
ple because he “didn’t have to go right then.”11 At this point, 
someone—either the officers or a doctor, but it is unclear who—
ordered a catheterization.12 The officers handcuffed Lockard to a bed 
and grabbed his ankles while the nurse pulled down his pants, despite 
Lockard’s telling the nurse he did not want to be catheterized.13 
Lockard said it “felt like something twisting where it ain’t supposed 
to be twisting.”14 
Lockard sued the officers for violating his Fourth Amendment 
rights, but the district court ruled that the officers were entitled to 
qualified immunity.15 After an extensive review of the case law sur-
rounding the Fourth Amendment and forced catheterization, the 
court concluded that “the existence and/or direction of any discern-
able trend in the law concerning forcible catheterizations is far from 
7. Mitch Smith, Philando Castile Family Reaches $3 Million Settlement, 
N.Y. Times (Jun. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/26/us/
philando-castile-family-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/59LA-6SRN]; 
Mitch Smith, Minnesota Officer Acquitted in Killing of Philando Castile, 
N.Y. Times (Jun. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/
police-shooting-trial-philando-castile.html [https://perma.cc/GH4Y-TKF 
G]. Qualified immunity most likely would not have been a factor in this 
lawsuit since it was against the city, and not the officer.
8. Lockard v. City of Lawrenceburg, 815 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1036–37 (S.D. 
Ind. 2011).
9. Id. at 1037.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1037–38.
12. Id. at 1038.
13. Id.
14. Ken Armstrong, When the Cops Take Your Urine by Force, MARSHALL 
PROJECT (Oct. 3, 2016, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/ 
2016/10/03/when-the-cops-take-your-urine-by-force#.F4jCD6LPO [https://
perma.cc/N6JG-N7VR].
15. Lockard, 815 F. Supp. 2d at 1051. 
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clear.”16 Therefore, the court could not hold the officers liable for their 
“bad guesses” in a “gray area.”17 
Qualified immunity presents a seemingly insurmountable obstacle 
for plaintiffs like Lockard and Philando Castile’s family if and when 
they decide to sue individual officers.18 When plaintiffs sue govern-
ment officials for violating their constitutional rights, the government 
officials can assert that they are qualifiedly immune from the suit. 
This immunity, according to the Supreme Court, protects 
“government officials performing discretionary functions . . . insofar as 
their conduct does not violate ‘clearly established’ statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.”19 The Harlow v. Fitzgerald20 Court—which created the 
modern qualified immunity doctrine—hoped these words would create 
a balance between public and governmental interests,21 but, as cur-
rently applied, qualified immunity tips too far in favor of the 
government. This is especially true in Fourth Amendment cases, 
where the standards are already deferential to government officials. 
The combination of qualified immunity and Fourth Amendment 
standards has made it extraordinarily difficult for plaintiffs to argue 
the merits. 
This is partly by design. One of the main objectives of the current 
qualified-immunity regime is preventing too many cases from pro-
ceeding to the merits.22 However, the pursuit of this goal has gone too 
far. The Supreme Court, under the current standard, has heard 28 
qualified immunity cases.23 Of those 28 cases, Fourth Amendment 
claims pervaded 21 of them.24 Of those 21, the Court found immunity 
in all but three.25 The Court certainly has legitimate interests in 
 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. No suit has yet been filed for Philando Castile. However, the judge in 
Michael Brown’s case has not yet ruled on any qualified-immunity issue, 
but has stated that qualified-immunity issues may appear in the summary-
judgment portion of the case. Brown v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:15CV00831 
ERW (E.D. Mo. July 16, 2015) (order partially dismissing claims). 
19. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
20. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
21. Id. at 819. 
22. See infra notes 68–78 and accompanying text. 
23. William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 Cal. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 45) available at https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2896508). 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
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qualified immunity, but the strength the Court has given the doctrine 
presents too great an obstacle for plaintiffs who potentially have 
meritorious claims. Too many cases are being denied their day in 
court. 
The Harlow standard, therefore, needs rebalancing. This Note 
argues that in order to strike the appropriate balance the Supreme 
Court attempted to find in Harlow, qualified immunity for Fourth 
Amendment claims should be determined through a case-by-case 
balancing test. Before beginning the analysis, a judge would assume 
there is a constitutional violation and then weigh an objective-
reasonableness factor, a subjective-standard factor, and, finally, a 
constitutional-development factor, which will encourage judges to 
determine the potential benefits to constitutional development if the 
case goes to trial. 
Part I traces the development of qualified immunity both 
generally and in the context of the Fourth Amendment. Part II 
discusses various critiques of qualified immunity. Part III presents the 
proposed alternative to qualified immunity for the Fourth Amend-
ment. Finally, Part IV presents and compares several other proposed 
alternatives to the balancing test. 
I. The Development of Qualified Immunity 
This Section focuses on the development of the current qualified-
immunity doctrine and how its evolution was motivated by certain 
themes and interests repeated by the Supreme Court. The first 
Subsection lays out the current iteration of the doctrine. The 
subsequent Subsections focus on the development of qualified immuni-
ty, with particular attention to cases that represented shifts in the 
doctrine. The final Subsection traces the development of qualified 
immunity in the context of the Fourth Amendment. 
A. Qualified Immunity: What Is It? 
Qualified immunity is a type of immunity government officials 
can assert when being sued for violating constitutional rights.26 It is 
an immunity from suit, not just an immunity from paying damages.27 
The immunity is qualified—as opposed to absolute—because it applies 
 
26. It also applies to statutory rights. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 
(1982) (“We therefore hold that government officials performing 
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages 
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”). 
Since this Note focuses on the Fourth Amendment, the discussion will be 
limited to constitutional rights. 
27. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). 
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unless: (1) the official violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and 
(2) the right the official violated was clearly established.28 Those 
conditions may be addressed in either order.29 The court has labeled 
these conditions as the constitutional question and the qualified-
immunity question, respectively.30 The clearly established right cannot 
be defined “at a high level of generality,” meaning, for example, that 
the right cannot simply be the language of the Fourth Amendment.31 
Furthermore, the right is clearly established if “[t]he contours of the 
right [are] sufficiently clear [so] that a reasonable official would 
understand that what he is doing violates that right.”32 The doctrine 
aims to “give[] government officials breathing room to make reason-
able but mistaken judgments about open legal questions.”33 The 
qualified-immunity question, therefore, is an objective analysis, asking 
how a reasonable government official would act.34 
B. Before Harlow 
Before Harlow, the Supreme Court defined qualified immunity as 
a good-faith immunity that had both an objective and subjective 
element.35 The pre-Harlow objective prong is similar to the qualified-
immunity question established by Harlow. The Supreme Court used 
such phrases as “reasonably appeared at the time,”36 “reasonable 
grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the 
circumstances,”37 and “clearly established constitutional rule.”38 These 
phrases represent one of the cores of qualified immunity: if a reason-
able government official would have believed they were not violating 
 
28. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 
29. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). 
30. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (“Deciding the 
constitutional question before addressing the qualified immunity question 
also promotes clarity in the legal standards for official conduct, to the 
benefit of both the officers and the general public.”). 
31. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742. 
32. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 
33. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 743. 
34. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 636–37. 
35. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815; Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 641 (1980); Wood 
v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975). 
36. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974). 
37. Wood, 420 U.S. at 318 (quoting Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247–48). 
38. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978). 
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the Constitution, then that official deserves immunity.39 In addition to 
this objective standard, courts gave equal weight to the official’s 
“good-faith belief” that what they were doing did not violate the 
Constitution.40 The Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized the 
importance of this subjective analysis, stating that “the official 
himself must be acting sincerely and with a belief that he is doing 
right.”41 
The Court viewed these questions as two sides of the same 
immunity coin. Neither question was more important than the other.42 
It would make no sense for an official to knowingly and willfully 
disregard someone’s constitutional rights yet be immune, and it would 
make no sense for an official to be immune when any other official 
would have known their actions were not constitutional.43 Both ob-
jective good faith and subjective good faith must be present.44 
One important pre-Harlow case developing this standard is 
Scheuer v. Rhodes.45 Scheuer specifically sheds light on the reasoning 
and interests behind this analysis, and qualified immunity in general. 
In Scheuer, the Court heard an appeal from the dismissal of a claim 
by the families of three students who died during the Kent State 
shootings.46 The families sued the Governor of Ohio and several 
officers involved in the shooting.47 The Court had to decide what kind 
of immunity applied to each government official.48 Scheuer outlined 
two historical reasons for recognizing some kind of immunity for 
government officials: the injustice in holding an official liable for exer-
cising official discretion, and the need to prevent officers from feeling 
deterred from performing their duties with the firmness needed for the 
public good.49 The opinion placed particular emphasis on the latter 
interest, stating that “the public interest requires decisions and action 
to enforce laws for the protection of the public.”50 Simultaneously, the 
 
39. Id. at 484. 
40. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247–48. 
41. Wood, 420 U.S. at 321. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247–48.  
45. 416 U.S. 232 (1974); John C. Williams, Note, Qualifying Qualified 
Immunity, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1299 (2012). 
46. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 234. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 242. 
49. Id. at 239–40. 
50. Id. at 241. 
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Court recognized that this interest was not strong enough to provide 
officers complete immunity from suit.51 Therefore, the Court weighed 
the interests between the need to redress constitutional wrongs and 
the need to protect officials performing discretionary functions. 
The Court did not directly address the exact parameters of 
immunity for higher executive officials such as the Governor, but it 
did lay out the parameters for qualified immunity for police officers, 
which is the subjective and objective standard discussed above.52 In 
creating this standard, the Court emphasized that police officers’ 
conduct should be evaluated based on probable cause and good faith.53 
The probable-cause factor lives in the objective prong and the good-
faith factor lives in the subjective standard.54 
There are several important takeaways from the Court’s earliest 
qualified immunity analyses: (1) the Court saw both the subjective 
and objective analysis as intertwined; (2) the defendant had to be 
within both the subjective and objective standards to obtain 
immunity;55 (3) the Court’s analysis was based on the intricacies of 
police work; and (4) the Court emphasized that constitutional wrongs 
should be redressed.56 
C. Harlow and the Elimination of Subjectivity 
Harlow announced the qualified-immunity standard still in force 
today. The Supreme Court has clarified the standard since the 
decision, but it has not deviated from the balance struck by Harlow. 
In Harlow, a former Air Force official sued two senior White 
House aides for a conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights.57 He 
claimed that the aides had fired him due to his plan to “‘blow the 
whistle’ on some ‘shoddy purchasing practices.’”58 Before addressing 
the scope of qualified immunity, the Court first held that these aides 
enjoyed only qualified immunity instead of an absolute executive 
 
51. Id. at 247–48. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 245; Williams, supra note 45, at 1300. 
54. The Court went on to remand the case to the lower court, as it could not 
make a decision on the factual record before it. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 249. 
This implies that the lower courts “must find at least some facts before 
dismissing the suit upon [the] basis [of qualified immunity].” Williams, 
supra note 45, at 1301. 
55. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975). 
56. Williams, supra note 45, at 1303. 
57. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 802 (1982). The official did not allege 
any violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. 
58. Id. at 804. 
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immunity.59 The Court emphasized that qualified immunity for of-
ficials “balance[s] competing values” of affording a damages remedy 
for constitutional violations against protecting officials who must use 
their discretion to perform official duties.60 
The Court then announced that qualified immunity would no 
longer be the two-part subjective and objective analysis outlined in 
Scheuer; qualified immunity would be limited to Scheuer’s objective 
prong.61 Qualified immunity would only protect “government officials 
performing discretionary functions . . . [when] their conduct does not 
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.”62 The Court gave the following 
reasons for rejecting the subjective standard. 
First, the subjective standard caused procedural problems.63 
Qualified immunity is raised before trial, when judges make decisions 
based on law, not fact.64 However, good faith is typically a fact 
question that should be resolved by a jury. Therefore, qualified im-
munity pre-Harlow asked courts to engage in an analysis that was 
properly left for the jury.65 Furthermore, because of the procedural 
posture, a plaintiff could easily survive a qualified-immunity defense 
by alleging malice and finding enough facts in the defendant’s history 
to suggest such malice.66 
These procedural issues created a second issue: it did not permit 
“insubstantial lawsuits to be quickly terminated.”67 One of the main 
motivators behind qualified immunity according to the Court is the 
ability to dispose of “insubstantial claims” before they go to trial.68 
The need to dispose of these claims is important because of the 
third—and most significant—issue created by the subjective analysis: 
 
59. Id. at 808–09. 
60. Id. at 807. 
61. Id. at 817–18. 
62. Id. at 818. 
63. John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. 
REV. 851, 852 (2010); Williams, supra note 45, at 1303. 
64. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), 56. 
65. See Williams, supra note 45, at 1303 (“As the Court saw it, the question 
of an official’s intent is one of fact; because questions of fact require a jury 
verdict, consideration of intent must await completion of the summary 
judgment phase.”). 
66. Jeffries, supra note 63, at 852. 
67. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
68. Id. at 815–16, 818. 
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increased costs to the parties.69 The Court stated that the defendants 
bore the typical costs from the lawsuit, including: distraction from 
duties, stifling discretion, and deterring potential officers who would 
otherwise want to serve.70 But subjectivity had “special costs.”71 Fact-
finding for subjectivity in discretionary acts has “no clear end.”72 
Parties would have to engage in broad discovery that would be 
especially “disruptive of effective government.”73 While these costs 
may seem to rest only on the defendant, the Court specifically noted 
that these costs are to “society as a whole.”74 
The Court decided that a purely objective standard would avoid 
these issues. Objectivity based on clearly established law is much 
easier to administer than a subjective standard, thus eliminating the 
procedural issues in the subjective analysis.75 Determining whether law 
is clearly established is well within the competence of a judge at sum-
mary judgment.76 The Court hoped the standard would enable lower 
courts to dismiss “insubstantial claims,” which would lead to less 
disruption of government77 and fewer costs to society. By changing the 
procedure to lessen the burdens of discovery and trial on government 
officials, the Court changed the substance of the law and its effects on 
society.78 
The Court also thought the objective standard would protect of-
ficials better than an objective and subjective standard. The Court 
outlined how this new standard would function: 
If the law at that time was not clearly established, an official 
could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal 
developments, nor could he fairly be said to “know” that the 
law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful. Until 
 
69. Id. at 817–18; Williams, supra note 45, at 1303; Alan K. Chen, The 
Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of Constitutional 
Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REV. 261, 275–76 (1995). 
70. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 816–17. 
73. Id. at 817. 
74. Id. at 814; Chen, supra note 69, at 276. 
75. Jeffries, supra note 63, at 852. 
76. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
77. Id. 
78. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. 
REV. 207, 251 (2013). 
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this threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should 
not be allowed.79 
This standard would better protect officials exercising their discretion 
because the current standard is a direct function of how an official 
would use their discretion: take the law as they know it and make a 
decision.80 Furthermore, the new standard would protect against over-
deterrence of official conduct.81 Early in the opinion, the Court em-
phasized the need to protect officials exercising their discretion.82 This 
purely objective standard would give officials a wide range of discre-
tion, so they would not have to fear repercussions for every single 
action they take.83 
The Court also believed that this new standard still honored the 
public interests in qualified immunity.84 The Court stated that an 
official who should know the law ought to hesitate, and any injury 
from not hesitating could be actionable.85 This goes directly to the 
public interest in obtaining money damages for constitutional 
wrongs.86 This also deters officials from committing constitutional 
torts in the future,87 which is obviously in the interest of the public. 
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that preventing over-deterrence is 
also a public interest. The Court briefly stated that the public interest 
“may be better served by action taken with independence and without 
fear of consequences.”88 Therefore, over-deterrence should weigh in 
both the public’s and the government’s favor.89 The Court has stood 
by these assertions and has vehemently emphasized the importance of 
qualified immunity to the public by reversing lower courts’ denials of 
 
79. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
80. Id. 
81. Chen, supra note 69, at 264. 
82. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807. 
83. See id. at 819 (explaining how an objective test protects the public 
interest). 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. See id. at 807 (discussing the interests balanced by qualified immunity). 
87. Chen, supra note 69, at 263. 
88. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). 
89. Aside from cost-saving and procedural fixes, the Court did not explain: 1) 
the drawbacks of including a subjective analysis, or 2) how a subjective 
analysis fails to aid interests in damages for constitutional remedies and 
protect officials who exercise their discretion. See id. at 814, 816, 818–19. 
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qualified immunity.90 In fact, the Court believes that qualified immu-
nity is important enough to the public that it feels the need to “often 
correct[] lower courts.”91 
Harlow left several questions open about how qualified immunity 
functions. One of the first questions was what right must be clearly 
established? Using the text of the Constitution itself creates a broad 
clearly established right that is easy to violate: any action that vio-
lates the Constitution is clearly established.92 This does not protect 
discretion in the way envisioned by Harlow, and there would be no 
balance in the Harlow interests.93 Therefore, the Court announced 
that “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear [so] that a 
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates 
that right.”94 The Court has reinforced this notion repeatedly, admon-
ishing lower courts “not to define clearly established law at a high 
level of generality.”95 This insures Harlow’s objective of giving officials 
“breathing room.”96 
Another question that arose was what makes clearly established 
law? Directly after announcing “the contours of the right,” the Court 
stated: “This is not to say that an official action is protected by 
qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously 
been held unlawful; but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing 
law the unlawfulness must be apparent.”97 What kinds of law makes 
the law “apparent” was still unanswered. The current commonly ac-
cepted answer is that lower courts must look to the Supreme Court’s 
controlling precedent to decipher whether a right was clearly estab-
lished.98 The Court in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd99 broadly concluded: “We do 
not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have 
placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”100 The 
Court cited a Fourth Amendment qualified immunity case, which only 
 
90. See City & Cty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 n.3 (2015) 
(listing cases in which lower courts wrongfully subjected individual officers 
to liability). 
91. Id. 
92. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 640. 
95. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011). 
96. Id. at 743. 
97. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (internal citation omitted). 
98. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. 
99. 563 U.S. 731 (2011). 
100. Id. at 741. 
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stated that “[d]efendants will not be immune if, on an objective basis, 
it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have con-
cludeed that a warrant should issue; but if officers of reasonable 
competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recog-
nized.”101 
The sweeping generalization in al-Kidd ignored controlling pre-
cedent to the contrary. In Wilson v. Layne,102 the Court permitted 
United States marshals to reference their own policy in considering 
whether a reasonable marshal would be able to ascertain case law.103 
In this case, officers entered a home pursuant to an arrest warrant, 
but they also allowed reporters into the home pursuant to the depart-
ment’s ride-along policies.104 The reporters took pictures of the home 
and observed the officers’ conduct.105 The Court held that bringing the 
reporters into the home violated the Fourth Amendment because their 
presence “was not in aid of the execution of the warrant.”106 
Nevertheless, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because 
“the state of the law . . . was at best undeveloped, [so] it was not 
unreasonable for law enforcement officers to look and rely on their 
formal ride-along policies.”107 
Furthermore, in Hope v. Pelzer,108 the Court explicitly relied on a 
Department of Corrections regulation, a Department of Justice report, 
and the outrageousness of the defendant’s conduct to hold that the 
defendants did not deserve qualified immunity.109 In this case, prison 
guards punished a prisoner by chaining him to a hitching post, shirt-
less, for 7 hours under the sun.110 The Court held—in addition to 
violating clearly established precedent—the prison guards’ actions 
were clearly unlawful because a DOJ report and a DOC regulation 
told the prison that this practice was unlawful before this incident.111 
Beyond the report, the “obvious cruelty” in the guards’ actions should 
have put the guards on notice that they were violating the prisoner’s 
 
101. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 
102. 526 U.S. 603 (1999). 
103. Id. at 617. 
104. Id. at 607. 
105. Id. at 607–08. 
106. Id. at 614. 
107. Id. at 617. 
108. 536 U.S. 730 (2002). 
109. Id. at 741–42. 
110. Id. at 734–35. 
111. Id. at 744–45. 
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constitutional rights.112 But in al-Kidd, the Court still limited itself to 
precedent, and it is commonly accepted that case law is the source of 
clearly established law.113 
D. The Saucier Experiment: The Interest in Constitutional 
Development 
The Supreme Court divided the Harlow test into two questions: 
(1) the “constitutional question,” which asks whether a constitutional 
right has been violated; and (2) the “qualified-immunity question,” 
which asks whether that right was clearly established.114 The Supreme 
Court attempted to restrict the way lower courts examine these 
questions in Saucier v. Katz.115 In Saucier, the Court declared that 
lower courts must address the constitutional question before address-
ing the qualified-immunity question.116 
To justify this, the Court added a new interest to the qualified-
immunity analysis: constitutional development. The Court stated: 
In the course of determining whether a constitutional right was 
violated on the premises alleged, a court might find it necessary 
to set forth principles which will become the basis for a holding 
that a right is clearly established. This is the process for the 
law’s elaboration from case to case, and it is one reason for our 
insisting upon turning to the existence or nonexistence of a 
constitutional right as the first inquiry. The law might be 
deprived of this explanation were a court simply to skip ahead 
to the question whether the law clearly established that the 
officer’s conduct was unlawful in the circumstances of the 
case.117 
This is a plain acknowledgment that articulating the boundaries 
of constitutional rights is just as valuable as the interests outlined in 
 
112. Id. at 745. 
113. See Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of the Habeas Corpus and the Rise 
of Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the 
Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some 
Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1247 
(2015) (“Hope was short lived.”); Avidan Cover, Reconstructing the Right 
Against Excessive Force, 68 Fla. L. Rev. 1773, 1814–16 (2016) (discussing 
the Court’s refusal to look beyond case precedent). 
114. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001); see supra note 30, and 
accompanying text. 
115. 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
116. Id. at 201. 
117. Id. 
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Harlow.118 By creating this system, the Court hoped that as courts 
ruled on more and more qualified-immunity cases, the law would be-
come clearer and clearer, making it easier for future plaintiffs to re-
cover for violations of their constitutional rights.119 It is plain to see 
how increasing the clarity of the law would also further the public-
interest values announced in Harlow. The clearer the law, the more 
likely a reasonable official would know the law and hesitate before 
acting, thus protecting citizens from unconstitutional discretionary 
acts.120 It would also prevent over-deterrence because the clearer the 
law is, the more confident officials can be that their actions are consti-
tutional.121 
This approach, however, was widely criticized. One critique was 
that the sequencing conflicts with the Court’s dedication to consti-
tutional avoidance.122 The Court has long adhered to the rule that if 
there are two grounds for deciding a case, one constitutional and one 
not, the Court should choose the latter course.123 The doctrine is 
based on separation of powers; the judiciary should not infringe on 
another branch’s constitutional powers if there is another basis for a 
decision.124 Saucier, however, asks courts to decide a constitutional 
question essentially as dictum before reaching the true holding of a 
case.125 Another major concern related to the practical effects of se-
quencing is the expenditure of judicial resources in deciding an 
unnecessary question.126 Justices opposed to sequencing voiced this 
concern often. Their view is best summarized by Justice Breyer: 
 
118. Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 405, 412 (2012). 
119. Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical 
Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667, 674 (2009); see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 
U.S. 800, 807 (1982) (discussing how absolute and qualified immunity 
have evolved through their application by the courts); Bunting v. Mellen, 
541 U.S. 1019, 1023–24 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that denial 
of review of an unfavorable collateral decision “undermines the purpose 
served by initial consideration of the constitutional question, which is to 
clarify constitutional rights without undue delay.”). 
120. See Chen, supra note 69, at 308 (discussing the benefits of clear 
constitutional rules to public officials). 
121. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819. 
122. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 428 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
123. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). 
124. Leong, supra note 119, at 676–77. 
125. Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1275–76 (2006). 
126. Leong, supra note 119, at 679–80. 
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“[W]hen courts’ dockets are crowded, a rigid ‘order of battle’ makes 
little administrative sense . . . .”127 This practical effect also cuts 
straight to the core of the Harlow doctrine: sequencing creates more 
costs in a doctrine aimed at reducing costs.128 One final criticism 
worth noting is that sequencing creates “bad constitutional law.”129 
The argument is that when a case raises complex constitutional issues, 
the court is not in a good position to decide those issues early in the 
proceedings, when most qualified-immunity motions occur.130 There-
fore, it would be better to allow the court to avoid deciding the 
constitutional question because “[n]o law . . . is better than bad 
law.”131 There is data to support this position. Nancy Leong conduct-
ed an empirical study of the effects of sequencing and found that most 
of the cases denied the existence of a right.132 Thus, sequencing did 
not expand constitutional rights as it was intended to do, even though 
it created more constitutional law.133 
The Court responded to this criticism by rejecting the rigidity of 
Saucier in Pearson v. Callahan.134 The Court recognized that sequenc-
ing can create unnecessary costs for the judiciary.135 The Court also 
recognized the potential for bad constitutional precedent from se-
quencing.136 Sequencing can create bad constitutional precedent, 
according to the Court, for the following reasons: 1) the decision may 
be so fact-bound that it has no precedential value,137 2) the value of 
deciding the question is reduced when the question will likely be 
decided by a higher court,138 3) the decision may rely on an “uncertain 
interpretation of state law,”139 4) the factual basis for a claim may be 
unclear due to qualified immunity’s assertion at the pleading stage,140 
 
127. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
128. Leong, supra note 119, at 680. 
129. Leval, supra note 125, at 1277. 
130. Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 859 (1998) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgment); Leong, supra note 119, at 680–81. 
131. Leong, supra note 119, at 681. 
132. Id. at 693. 
133. Id. at 670. 
134. 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
135. Id. at 236–37. 
136. Id. at 237. 
137. Id.  
138. Id. at 237–38.  
139. Id. at 238.  
140. Id. at 238–39. 
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and 5) the briefing for the lower court may be “woefully inade-
quate.”141 The Court also recognized sequencing’s tension with consti-
tutional avoidance.142 
However, despite all of the recognized costs of sequencing, the 
Court did not forbid lower courts from using the Saucier framework; 
it simply made it voluntary. The Court held that judges should be 
permitted to use their discretion in deciding which prong of the 
qualified-immunity analysis to address first.143 The Court recognized 
two situations where sequencing might help the lower courts. First, 
there are situations where deciding the constitutional rights question 
is necessary to deciding whether that right was clearly established.144 
Second, there is a value to developing constitutional precedent “with 
respect to questions that do not frequently arise in cases in which a 
qualified-immunity defense is unavailable.”145 Therefore, the Court 
recognized that there are situations where constitutional development 
can be useful. While the strict framework of Saucier died with 
Pearson, the Court preserved a new interest in qualified immunity: 
the possible need for constitutional development.146 It has seen fit to 
adhere to Saucier sequencing in cases after Pearson.147 
E. Qualified Immunity and the Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
 
141. Id. at 239.  
142. Id. at 241. 
143. Id. at 236. 
144. Id. (quoting Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 581 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(Sutton, J., concurring)). 
145. Id. 
146. See Nancy Leong, Improving Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 377, 384 (2014) 
(“Pearson thus reinforces the importance of rights-making and maintains 
qualified immunity adjudication as a vehicle for such rights-making.”). 
147. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1. v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 379 
(2009) (holding that an assistant principal’s reasonable suspicion that a 13-
year-old student was distributing drugs did not justify a strip search, but 
that he was still qualifiedly immune because he did not violate clearly 
established law); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2024 (2014) 
(holding that a police officer’s use of force, firing 15 shots, to end a car 
chase was reasonable and did not violate clearly established law). 
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particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.148 
There are two important phrases in this Amendment for the sake 
of this analysis: “unreasonable searches and seizures” and “probable 
cause.”149 
[Probable cause] merely requires that the facts available to the 
officer would “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the 
belief,” that certain items may be contraband or stolen property 
or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any 
showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than 
false. A “practical, nontechnical” probability that incriminating 
evidence is involved is all that is required.150 
Without a warrant, searches and seizures need to meet some level of 
reasonableness and depend on the facts before the officer.151 This will 
become important as the Court applies qualified immunity to Fourth 
Amendment claims. 
Post-Harlow, the Court quickly faced cases applying their new 
qualified-immunity standard to Fourth Amendment claims. In Malley 
v. Briggs152 the Court heard a claim that officers violated two men’s 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by applying for warrants 
for their arrest without probable cause.153 A judge signed the warrants 
 
148. U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
149. Id. 
150. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (citation omitted). 
151. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (stating that an 
officer does not use excessive force if the officer’s conduct was “objectively 
reasonable”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 414–15 (1976) 
(holding a warrantless public arrest was reasonable even without the 
presence of accepted exceptions to the warrant requirement); United States 
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (holding that a full search of person 
after arrest based on probable cause is reasonable without a separate 
warrant for the search); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (holding that 
an officer may seize a person and search them for weapons if they have a 
reasonable articulable suspicion the person is going to commit a crime and 
that they are armed); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967) 
(discussing that when a court decides whether to create an exception to the 
warrant requirement, it balances the privacy interests of the public against 
the legitimate government interests in being unburdened by a warrant); 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352–53 (1967) (holding that a search 
under the Fourth Amendment occurs when there is a subjective 
expectation of privacy and that expectation of privacy is reasonable). 
152. 475 U.S. 335 (1986). 
153. Id. at 338. Interestingly, the lower court did not hear the claim for 
qualified immunity until the close of the plaintiff’s case at trial. Id. This 
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after they were filed, the men were arrested, but a grand jury did not 
indict them.154 The officers argued that they were absolutely immune 
because the arrest had been permitted by a judge, and if they were 
not absolutely immune, “applying for a warrant is per se objectively 
reasonable, provided that the officer believes that the facts alleged in 
his affidavit are true.”155 The Court quickly disposed of the officers’ 
first arguments, stating that it is possible for a situation to be so 
“obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded 
that a warrant should issue.”156 The Court further laid out a frame-
work for when an officer cannot be qualifiedly immune when sued for 
violating constitutional rights even with a warrant: “Only where the 
warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to 
render official belief in its existence unreasonable . . . will the shield of 
immunity be lost.”157 Applying for a warrant would not always be 
reasonable because a reasonable officer could know that a warrant 
application does not actually establish probable cause. Therefore, be-
fore applying for a warrant, officers must use “reasonable professional 
judgment.”158 
The next year, in Anderson v. Creighton,159 the Court held that 
qualified immunity was available to officers sued for allegedly un-
reasonable warrantless searches.160 According to the plaintiffs, they 
were spending a quiet evening at home when, suddenly, a spotlight, 
held by officers brandishing shotguns, flashed through their front 
door.161 The officers believed that a man suspected of robbery might 
be in the house.162 When Mr. Creighton led the officers to the garage 
to look at his car, one of the officers punched him in the face claiming 
that Mr. Creighton attempted to grab his gun, but Mr. Creighton said 
he was only attempting to open the garage door.163 Mrs. Creighton 
then phoned her mother but was allegedly kicked by an officer who 
 
seems, on the surface, to go against one of the purposes of qualified 
immunity: preventing needless trials. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 339, 345. 
156. Id. at 341. 
157. Id. at 344–45 (citation omitted). 
158. Id. at 346. 
159. 483 U.S. 635 (1987). 
160. Id. at 641. 
161. Creighton v. City of St. Paul, 766 F.2d 1269, 1270 (8th Cir. 1985). 
162. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 637. 
163. Creighton, 766 F.2d at 1270–71. 
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grabbed the phone and told her to hang up.164 As the Creightons’ chil-
dren ran out of the house to safety, officers chased them and allegedly 
grabbed and shook the Creightons’ 10-year-old daughter.165 The offi-
cers did not find the robbery suspect or any evidence that the 
Creightons were involved in the crime, but they arrested Mr. 
Creighton for obstructing justice.166 The Creightons argued that quali-
fied immunity should not apply to alleged Fourth Amendment 
violations because the core of a Fourth Amendment allegation is 
unreasonable conduct, and one cannot reasonably behave unreason-
ably.167 
The Court expressly rejected the Creightons’ contention.168 The 
Court principally relied on stare decisis, stating that the Creightons’ 
argument was invalid because the Court has already applied qualified 
immunity to Fourth Amendment violations.169 The Court further 
argued that the perceived problem rested on the terminology of the 
Fourth Amendment, as opposed to the substance.170 If the Framers 
had used “undue” instead of “unreasonable,” the Creightons would 
have no argument.171 The Court went on to point out that the liber-
ties guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment are an accommodation 
between the government and the individual; therefore, reasonableness 
applies.172 The Court noted that officers deserve the same deference 
for objectively reasonable decisions regarding difficult questions as any 
other official.173 The Court reasoned that qualified immunity applies 
even in situations of unlawful warrantless searches of innocent parties’ 
homes.174 Tailoring the analysis to the right creates undue complexity, 
in the Court’s view.175 Furthermore, qualified immunity is supposed to 
provide protection for officers making reasonable determinations, re-
 
164. Id. at 1271. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 643. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 643–44. 
173. Id. at 644. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 645. 
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gardless of the nature of the violation alleged.176 On remand, the dis-
trict court held that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity.177 
The Court held this ground in Saucier.178 In Saucier, the Court 
heard similar arguments to those made by the Creightons but 
regarding an excessive-force claim.179 The Court previously held that 
excessive-force claims should be judged by the “objective reasonable-
ness standard” of the Fourth Amendment, as opposed to a substan-
tive due process standard.180 The plaintiff in Saucier argued that the 
merits analysis in excessive-force cases mirrored the immunity 
analysis.181 Therefore, officers already receive the protection desired in 
Anderson through the excessive-force standard.182 Furthermore, the 
plaintiff argued that the standard works well, making the qualified-
immunity standard “superfluous and inappropriate.”183 The Court dis-
agreed. The Court held that the reasonableness in qualified-immunity 
and excessive-force claims were different.184 The Court argued that 
qualified-immunity reasonableness was only about whether the officer 
made a “reasonable mistake[]” about the applicability of a rule.185 “An 
officer might correctly perceive all of the relevant facts but have a 
mistaken understanding as to whether a particular amount of force is 
legal in those circumstances;” they can make a reasonable mistake 
about the rule while violating the rule.186 Qualified immunity, accord-
ing to the Court, can still protect officers operating in the “hazy 
border between excessive and acceptable force.”187 
The same stacking of analyses present in the reasonableness 
standard is also present in the method for interpreting facts in quali-
fied immunity under the Fourth Amendment. In a typical motion for 
summary judgment or motion to dismiss, the facts are interpreted in 
 
176. Id. at 646. 
177. Creighton v. Anderson, 724 F. Supp. 654, 661 (D. Minn. 1989). 
178. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 204 (2001). 
179. Id. at 203–04. 
180. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). 
181. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 204. 
182. Brief for Respondents at 7, Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (No. 99-
1977), 2001 WL 173527, at *5. 
183. Id.; Saucier, 533 U.S. at 204. 
184. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 204–05. 
185. Id. at 205. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. at 206 (citing Priester v. Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 926 (11th Cir. 
2000)). 
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the light most favorable to the non-moving party.188 However, this 
standard does not fully apply to the qualified-immunity defense. 
When qualified immunity is asserted, the Court should “consider[] 
only the facts that were knowable to the defendant officers.”189 There-
fore, only the facts knowable to the officers may be considered, but 
they must be construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.190 
This idea stems directly from how courts determine objective reason-
ableness for Fourth Amendment violations. In White v. Pauly,191 the 
Court cited a non-qualified-immunity excessive-force decision for this 
standard.192 The cited case stated that objective reasonableness must 
be determined “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the 
scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 
vision of hindsight.”193 Therefore, the method of interpreting facts for 
a qualified-immunity claim under the Fourth Amendment is the exact 
same method as how facts must be interpreted when deciding the 
merits of an alleged Fourth Amendment violation. 
The Court has not wavered from the holdings of Anderson and 
Saucier, and has freely scrutinized facts to determine whether officers 
acted unreasonably.194 
 
188. United States v. Diebold, 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). 
189. White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 550 (2017) (citing Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 
135 S. Ct. 2466, 2474 (2015)). 
190. Id. 
191. 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017). 
192. Id. at 550. 
193. Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015). 
194. In 2012, the Court held that it was reasonable for an officer to search for 
multiple firearms even though the warrant limited the search to one 
firearm, and that the officer was not “entirely unreasonable” in searching 
for gang paraphernalia when the officer believed they had probable cause 
pursuant to a warrant. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1246–
47 (2012). The Court noted that it was not necessary to decide whether 
probable cause existed, but only whether the officers were “plainly 
incompetent.” Id. at 1249. In 2013, the Court found that it was not clearly 
established that a police officer’s warrantless entry into someone’s backyard 
while in hot pursuit of a suspect violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment 
rights because no case law clearly established this right. Stanton v. Sims, 
134 S. Ct. 3, 7 (2013). The Court did not state whether or not the police 
officer violated the Fourth Amendment; it stated only that the officer was 
not “plainly incompetent.” Id. In 2014, the Court held that officers were 
entitled to qualified immunity because they acted reasonably in using 
deadly force, by firing fifteen shots, to terminate a high-speed car chase. 
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2021–22 (2014). Therefore, there was 
no Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at 2024. In 2015, the Court held there 
was no Fourth Amendment violation when officers used potentially deadly 
force on a mentally ill patient wielding a knife who would not stop 
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One of the more recent Fourth Amendment qualified-immunity 
cases deserves lengthier attention: Mullenix v. Luna.195 On March 23, 
2010, in Tulia, Texas, Israel Leija, Jr., led the police on an 18-minute 
car chase on I-27 at speeds between 85–110 miles per hour. He called 
the police dispatcher twice saying he had a gun and would shoot the 
police if they did not stop the chase. The dispatcher informed pursu-
ing officers of these threats and that Leija may be intoxicated. 
Officers—who had received training on how to set up spike strips and 
take defensive positions while waiting for the suspect—set up tire 
spikes at three locations. One officer arrived after the spike strips 
were set and took a position on an overpass above them. He took this 
position to explore another tactic: shooting Leija’s car to disable it. 
He had never attempted this tactic before and had no training in it. 
He told the dispatcher to ask his supervisor whether he should pro-
ceed with this tactic, but he took a shooting position before receiving 
a response. It was alleged, however, that the officer could hear the 
supervisor’s response of “see if the spike strips work first” from his 
position. Once Leija’s car came into sight, the officer fired six shots at 
the vehicle. The vehicle kept moving, hit the spike strips, hit the 
median, and came to a stop. Leija was killed by the officer’s shots, 
four of which hit Leija and none of which hit the car.196 When the 
officer encountered his supervising officer later, he said, “How’s that 
for proactive?”197 
The Supreme Court reversed the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit’s denial of qualified immunity.198 It chastised the 
lower court for defining the right at too high a level of specificity.199 
The Fifth Circuit defined the right as “it is unreasonable for a police 
officer to use deadly force against a fleeing felon who does not pose a 
sufficient threat of harm to the officer or others.”200 Instead, the 
Supreme Court held the Fifth Circuit should have examined whether 
 
approaching the officers, and the officers’ entry was not unreasonable just 
because it caused a violent reaction. City & Cty. of San Francisco v. 
Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775–77 (2015). Despite this holding, the Court 
noted that it “need not decide whether the Constitution was violated” 
because the officers’ conduct did not violate clearly established precedent. 
Id. at 1778. 
195. 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015). 
196. Id. at 306–07. 
197. Id. at 316 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
198. Id. at 312 (majority opinion). 
199. Id. at 308–09. 
200. Luna v. Mullenix, 773 F.3d 712, 725 (5th Cir. 2014). 
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the officer acted unreasonably “beyond debate.”201 The Court held 
that none of its precedents involving car chases “squarely governs” 
this case given the light traffic on I-27 at the time and the threats 
Leija made against officers.202 Against this backdrop, the Court could 
not conclude that the officer’s actions were “plainly incompetent.”203 
While ignoring the constitutional question, the Court did note the 
importance of specificity of the Fourth Amendment right because “it 
is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant 
legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation 
the officer confronts.”204 
In Mullenix, the Court exhibited several of the trends that have 
come up in the development of qualified immunity: (1) it reiterated 
the importance of applying qualified immunity to officers;205 (2) it 
applied qualified immunity to a reasonableness standard;206 (3) it 
reiterated the importance of appropriately defining the right;207 (4) it 
ignored rules and policies—here being the supervisor’s order—and 
instead focused on judicial precedent;208 and (5) it failed to state 
whether or not there was a constitutional violation. 
II. Critiques of Qualified Immunity 
A. Qualified Immunity Generally—Weighing Heavily for                
the Government 
1. Inappropriately Defining Clearly Established Law 
Many commentators have criticized the Court’s definition of 
clearly established law.209 Though the Court has frequently stated that 
prior cases which are factually identical are not required,210 the Court 
inevitably searches for factually similar cases.211 Courts, therefore, 
 
201. Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 309. 
202. Id. at 310. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 308. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. at 310. 
209. See infra notes 225–229, 231, 236, 238–240 and accompanying text. 
210. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). 
211. Karen Blum et al., Qualified Immunity Developments: Not Much Hope Left 
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compare the facts of the case before it to these similar precedents. 
This “extends qualified immunity beyond any defensible rationale.”212 
Making judges search for factually similar cases creates a cover for 
judges to overlook liability in cases that may merit liability.213 There 
can be conduct that is both unconstitutional and unreasonable, yet es-
capes liability because no case is exactly on point.214 The Court 
seemed to recognize this concern in Hope when it did not limit its 
search for clearly established law to precedent.215 However, in 
Brosseau v. Haugen,216 the Court “veered back toward requiring pre-
cedential specificity.”217 
Brosseau also represents the paradigm of this issue in determining 
clearly established law. In Brosseau, officers responded to a call that 
men were fighting in a yard.218 When the officers arrived, Haugen—
one of the fighting men—disappeared. The officers searched for 30 to 
45 minutes. When the officers heard a report that Haugen was down 
the street, an officer ran to pursue. When she arrived, Haugen appear-
ed and jumped into a jeep. The officer arrived at the jeep, drew her 
gun, and told Haugen to get out of the vehicle. Haugen ignored the 
commands and looked for the keys. The officer struck Haugen in the 
head with her gun, but Haugen still found the keys and started the 
car. Once Haugen began to drive, the officer shot him because she 
thought other officers in the area or citizens would be in danger with 
him driving. Haugen suffered a collapsed lung but survived.219 The 
Court examined three cases and held: “These three cases taken 
together undoubtedly show that this area is one in which the result 
depends very much on the facts of each case.”220 Therefore, no case 
clearly established a violation of the Fourth Amendment.221 Although 
it may seem that the use of deadly force was unreasonable because 
there was no evidence Haugen had a weapon or intended to do anyone 
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harm, the Court could not answer that question because no case was 
on point. 
Furthermore, requiring plaintiffs to find precedent with this level 
of specificity creates a heightened standard that is difficult to 
overcome.222 The ambiguity in the definition of the right223 means that 
clearly established law has to be at “a very specific level of 
generality.”224 The narrower the right, the more difficult it is to find 
factually similar precedent.225 This makes any claim that a right was 
clearly established likely to fail and converts qualified immunity to 
near absolute immunity.226 
2. Inappropriate Fact-Finding 
Some commentators believe that the legal analysis in qualified 
immunity is actually a factual analysis best reserved for the jury.227 
The Supreme Court proclaims that qualified immunity is supposed to 
be a legal question decided by a court.228 In reality, asking courts to 
decide whether the right was clearly established is a mixed question of 
law and fact.229 This creates several issues. First, asking a court to 
decide what a reasonable official would think was legal asks judges to 
put themselves in the defendant’s shoes.230 They must look at the 
facts and decide how a reasonable officer would perceive them in light 
of the law.231 Construing facts is necessarily the job of the fact-finder 
at trial, not a judge before trial.232 Second, many potential qualified-
immunity cases involve competing narratives with disputed facts, 
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making it inappropriate for a court to resolve these factual disputes in 
deciding whether a right was clearly established.233 Third, because 
qualified immunity is typically raised early in the proceedings, the 
court denies plaintiffs the opportunity to appropriately develop their 
narrative and facts.234 Plaintiffs are denied an opportunity for discov-
ery and therefore must present a “barebones” version of their story.235 
Fourth, the effects of the factual analysis are in tension with the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.236 The Harlow standard asks judges 
to be more proactive in resolving cases than contemplated by Rules 12 
and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; the standards laid out 
by those rules are in tension with how judges view facts in qualified 
immunity.237 
This problem is evident in Mullenix. Justice Sotomayor’s lone 
dissent framed her approach as the appropriate way to evaluate the 
facts.238 She claimed that the majority ignored the officer asking for 
permission to shoot from his supervisor and spent minutes in shooting 
position before Leija arrived.239 Instead, “[t]he majority recharacterizes 
[the officer]’s decision to shoot at Leija’s engine block as a split-
second, heat-of-the-moment choice, made when the suspect was 
‘moments away.’”240 Instead of construing the facts in favor of the 
plaintiff, the majority reframed the facts in a manner advantageous to 
the officer. 
3. Lack of Constitutional Development 
The discretion granted by the Court in Pearson comes at the 
price of constitutional development. Courts have significant incentives 
to avoid analyzing the merits of the case and skip straight to the 
clearly established prong.241 One of the main critiques of Saucier is 
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that it expended unnecessary judicial resources.242 Now, free from Sau-
cier, overworked judges may want to take the “short route” instead of 
dealing with the merits of a case.243 This creates future costs.244 Judges 
constantly taking the easy way out in one area of the law creates a 
situation where “civil rights questions go repeatedly unanswered.”245 
This becomes a cycle where a constitutional violation need not be an-
swered “because the law is unclear and the law is unclear because the 
violation continues to go unaddressed.”246 
White provides a telling example. In this case, police responded to 
a road rage incident where a man had a nonviolent confrontation with 
two women on the highway. After the confrontation, the man went 
home, where he lived with his brother. Two officers arrived at the 
house and “approached it in a covert manner to maintain officer 
safety.”247 When the officers spotted two men in the house, they called 
Officer White for backup. When the brothers realized there was some-
one outside their home, they shouted, wanting to know who was 
outside. The two officers laughed and informed the brothers they were 
surrounded and needed to come out. At some point one of the officers 
identified themselves as state police, but the brothers did not hear the 
announcement. They informed the officers that they had guns. Officer 
White arrived in time to hear the brothers shout they had guns and 
immediately drew his gun. The man then stepped out of the house 
and fired two shots, and his brother stepped out of the house and 
pointed his gun towards Officer White. Officer White shot and killed 
the brother.248 The brother’s estate sued all three officers for violating 
his Fourth Amendment rights. The District Court for the District of 
New Mexico denied the officers’ motions for qualified immunity, and 
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The lower courts 
analyzed the qualified-immunity claim of Officer White separately 
from the other officers since he arrived at the scene later.249 The 
Tenth Circuit determined that it was clearly established that “a rea-
sonable officer in White’s position would believe that a warning [of 
the use of force] was required despite the threat of serious harm.”250 
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The Tenth Circuit also held that a jury could reasonably conclude 
that White used excessive force.251 
The Supreme Court vacated the denial of White’s qualified-
immunity claim and remanded.252 It did not address whether Officer 
White violated the Fourth Amendment. Instead, it held that no 
clearly established rights were violated.253 It was reasonable for White 
to assume proper procedure had been followed prior to his arrival.254 It 
further recognized that because of White’s delayed arrival, this case 
was unique factually.255 Because of that uniqueness, “[n]o settled 
Fourth Amendment principle requires that officer[s] . . . second-guess 
the earlier steps already taken by [their] fellow officers in instances 
like the one White confronted here.”256 Now, there most likely never 
will be. The Court recognized that this is a unique situation, in terms 
of finding similar precedent,257 yet it refused to take this opportunity 
to clearly establish whether or not this is a violation. Though the sit-
uation may be unique in terms of Supreme Court precedent, it is not 
a stretch to assume that officers arriving at scenes late is not unique. 
But because the Court had not ruled on this specific fact pattern 
before, it could not rule on it here. This case furthers a situation 
where a constitutional violation need not be answered “because the 
law is unclear, and the law is unclear because the violation continues 
to go unaddressed.”258 
4. Lack of Subjectivity 
Eliminating subjectivity from the Harlow standard leaves the gap 
mentioned in Scheuer.259 Objective intent now trumps intentional 
wrongdoing.260 Justice Stevens stated that the lack of subjectivity in 
the immunity analysis causes problems in two kinds of cases: (1) cases 
where the court awards damages only if a culpable state of mind is 
established; and (2) if the official’s conduct is regulated by “an ex-
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tremely general and deeply entrenched norm, such as the command of 
due process or probable cause.”261 
The second problem is present in many qualified-immunity 
cases—especially Fourth Amendment cases. The Fourth Amendment 
standards are “extremely general and deeply entrenched.”262 This 
exact problem is evident in Mullenix, where, after the officer dis-
obeyed a supervisor and fired six shots at a speeding car, he said 
“How’s that for proactive?”263 This comment, however, has no impact 
on the immunity analysis because the analysis only focuses on 
objective reasonableness. If subjective intent had been a factor, the of-
ficer’s comment and refusal to follow orders could have shifted the 
case towards a denial of immunity. 
B. Qualified Immunity and the Fourth Amendment 
1. Double Reasonableness Protection 
The arguments offered by the plaintiffs in Anderson and Saucier 
decrying the double reasonableness of Fourth Amendment qualified 
immunity—double reasonableness being the stacking of one reason-
ableness analysis on top of another—have been supported by both 
Justices and commentators.264 Justice Stevens critiqued double reason-
ableness in his dissent in Anderson. He described probable cause as a 
form of immunity in and of itself.265 Thus, by applying qualified 
immunity in Anderson, the Court created a double layer of insulation 
for law enforcement officers.266 He claimed that there was no reason to 
create this double layer of immunity when “the probable-cause stand-
ard itself recognizes the fair leeway that law enforcement officers must 
have in carrying out their dangerous work.”267 The Harlow standard in 
this context does no more to encourage action when officers are 
uncertain of the law than the existing Fourth Amendment standard.268 
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Therefore, while the Court’s aims were noble, Justice Stevens felt that 
the Court’s holding double counted the officer’s interest, while an 
individual’s interest gets counted only once.269 Justice Ginsburg re-
newed this criticism in her concurrence in Saucier. She stated that the 
Court’s excessive-force standard is “sufficient to resolve cases.”270 
Justice Ginsburg emphasized that the Court’s double reasonableness 
will lead to confusion for lower courts.271 This confusion arises because 
the constitutional inquiry and immunity inquiry ask the same 
question: “Taking into account the particular circumstances confront-
ing the defendant officer, could a reasonable officer, identically 
situated, have believed the force employed was lawful?”272 This confu-
sion places added difficulty on courts in Fourth Amendment qualified-
immunity cases.273 Courts must attempt to distinguish the two 
reasonableness analyses, even though they seem indistinguishable.274 
Even if the double reasonableness could easily be distinguished, 
the confusion and discomfort with a double-reasonableness analysis 
can be shown by the following example: A jury could find that it is 
objectively unreasonable to tase a handcuffed suspect, but a judge 
may find that no case law made the officer’s actions unreasonable.275 
Further, 
if the jury believes the plaintiff, the use of force is going to be 
objectively unreasonable and there is not going to be qualified 
immunity. But you are going to have the rare case where you 
could have both unreasonable force and qualified immunity due 
to the lack of clarity in the law.276 
Therefore, the Court has created a standard where an officer can 
reasonably act unreasonably. This creates even more deference for the 
officer than originally envisioned in Harlow.277 
This double reasonableness also creates practical issues. The 
confusion and deference created has led lower courts to find immunity 
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in situations when “liability seems fully justified.”278 Furthermore, 
double reasonableness creates more avenues for inappropriate fact-
finding by the judge.279 Justice Stevens’ dissent in Brosseau supports 
this view, stating that the appropriate question in Brosseau was “how 
a reasonable officer making the split-second decision to use deadly 
force would have assessed the foreseeability of a serious accident.”280 
Justice Stevens argued that no matter how strong the interest in re-
solving these cases at early stages, there was no justification in taking 
away this fact question from the jury.281 Therefore, the general 
problem of courts answering fact questions as legal questions is even 
greater in the Fourth Amendment context. 
2. Difficulty in Enforcing the Fourth Amendment 
The Supreme Court’s emphasis on appropriately defining the right 
has come at the cost of making it difficult to enforce the Fourth 
Amendment. In Mullenix, the Court reversed the denial of qualified 
immunity because the right was defined too broadly.282 Justice 
Sotomayor’s dissent chastises the Court for creating a culture of 
“shoot first, think later.”283 Justice Sotomayor notes that this culture 
makes “the protections of the Fourth Amendment hollow.”284 While 
the approach Justice Sotomayor discusses also involves inappro-
priately scrutinizing facts,285 the approach relies heavily on the level of 
specificity of the right. By repeatedly emphasizing the need to 
specifically define the right, the Court renders the Fourth Amendment 
“hollow”286 because no clearly established law can unambiguously 
define such a specific right. The Fourth Amendment is uniquely dif-
ficult because it involves officers applying broad standards to specific 
situations.287 When the right is defined too specifically, no Fourth 
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Amendment violation can be clearly established; this causes the 
Fourth Amendment to lose its teeth, leaving it difficult to enforce.288 
3. Clearly Established Law Defined by Case Law Is Inappropriate 
Using case law to define reasonableness overestimates a typical 
officer’s knowledge of case law. The ability to parse complex rules 
from a body of case law is a skill people attend law school for three 
years to acquire.289 It therefore seems preposterous to create a stand-
ard that expects officers to be familiar with complex, ever-changing 
case law when they are better versed in local policies.290 This overly 
technical idea of notice should be inapplicable when there is, instead, 
a “common social duty” not to do something one should know is 
wrong.291 Similarly, police officers should feel a “common social duty” 
not to use excessive force absent precedent putting them on notice in 
a factually similar situation.292 
4. The Lens for Interpreting Facts Is the Same Lens as the Fourth 
Amendment 
Just as the qualified-immunity reasonableness analysis is the same 
as that for Fourth Amendment reasonableness, facts are interpreted 
similarly in qualified-immunity and in Fourth Amendment cases. 
Qualified immunity takes the facts that were knowable to the officer 
at the time, which is the same method used to interpret facts in 
Fourth Amendment cases.293 Though admittedly not as troublesome 
as double reasonableness, this stacking of similar analyses distances 
the analysis from the actual case and facts in a manner that is un-
necessary and confusing. 
5. Financial Costs and Deterrence Claims Are Unfounded 
Though one of the main motivations for the Harlow standard is 
the prevention of personal-liability costs and over-deterrence, these 
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fears do not seem founded on reality.294 Joanna Schwartz’s study 
shows that police officers rarely contribute financially to the settle-
ment or judgment of a civil-rights case.295 She also stated that other 
studies indicate that officers’ conduct is not substantially influenced 
by potential liability in civil-rights suits.296 Consequently, she con-
cluded that, to the extent qualified immunity aims at protecting 
officers from the financial burdens of suit and preventing over-
deterrence, qualified immunity’s stringent standards have no justifi-
cation.297 
III. A New Balance to Qualified Immunity in the 
Fourth Amendment 
This Section lays out the argument for a new qualified-immunity 
standard in the context of the Fourth Amendment. First, it discusses 
why the Fourth Amendment should have its own qualified-immunity 
standard. Then, it presents the new standard. 
A. Why the Fourth Amendment Deserves Its Own Qualified-Immunity 
Standard 
Fourth Amendment qualified immunity materially differs from 
qualified immunity in other contexts. This is largely due to the 
double-reasonableness problem.298 Qualified immunity works best with 
definite rules and doctrines that create a stable body of law that can 
easily be clearly established.299 Qualified immunity “works least well 
when constitutional doctrine is stated at a very high level of general-
ity unaccompanied by particularizing doctrine.”300 The doctrines de-
veloped from the Fourth Amendment are such standards.301 They are 
defined at a high level of generality.302 The standards are all based on 
reasonableness—a far cry from a stable rule because reasonableness 
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varies from situation to situation. Therefore, due to the high gener-
ality, vague standards, and specialized problems discussed above,303 
the Harlow standard does not work well with the Fourth Amendment. 
Furthermore, double reasonableness makes it more difficult for courts 
to avoid engaging in fact-finding on a supposedly purely legal ques-
tion.304 Also, the Fourth Amendment standards mimic the qualified-
immunity analysis.305 They permit reasonable error, which is part of 
qualified-immunity’s aim,306 and they interpret facts the same way.307 
Therefore, courts essentially perform the same analysis twice. 
These arguments would lay a convincing foundation for abolishing 
qualified immunity in Fourth Amendment settings. If the Fourth 
Amendment allows for reasonable mistakes and interprets facts the 
same way as qualified immunity, then the easiest solution would be to 
eliminate qualified immunity in this context.308 
However appealing this argument may be, it is impractical. The 
Supreme Court decided that alleged Fourth Amendment violations 
deserve potential qualified-immunity protection long ago, and it re-
fuses to waver.309 The Supreme Court wants to afford officers some 
kind of extra protection in these situations beyond Fourth Amend-
ment standards. Thus, the best solution would be to recognize that 
the Fourth Amendment creates special problems for qualified immu-
nity, and fixing those problems requires a specialized solution.310 
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B. The New Balance 
To address the problems with qualified immunity in the Fourth 
Amendment context, this Note proposes two major alterations to the 
analysis: (1) the constitutional question should be eliminated from the 
analysis, and (2) courts should balance three factors to decide whether 
a case should proceed to trial. The three factors should be the sub-
jective prong of Scheuer,311 a reasonableness test based on what a 
reasonable officer would have done, and a question asking whether 
allowing the case to proceed to trial and thus get a decision on the 
merits “will be ‘beneficial’ in ‘develop[ing] constitutional prece-
dent.’”312 
1. Removing the Constitutional Question 
Removing the question of whether there was a constitutional 
violation from the qualified-immunity analysis clarifies that the 
qualified-immunity question is separate from the constitutional 
question. Qualified immunity is not about whether there was a vio-
lation; it is about protecting officials reasonably exercising their 
discretion.313 Entertaining the idea of whether there was a consti-
tutional violation as a basis for immunity is a recipe for the creation 
of bad law.314 Neither the judge nor the defendant has an incentive to 
address the question adequately because immunity necessarily hinges 
on the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct.315 Furthermore, the 
immunity question and the constitutional question in the Fourth 
Amendment context are essentially the same question, and they are 
analyzed in the same way.316 Eliminating the constitutional question 
will help distinguish the two analyses and brings qualified immunity 
closer to eliminating the double-reasonableness problem. Finally, due 
to the complexity and fact-laden analysis of Fourth Amendment vio-
lations, courts are not in a good position to decide these questions de-
finitively.317 Qualified immunity is difficult enough to navigate as it is, 
so shifting the focus will allow for a more cohesive analysis. 
This would not preclude the courts from answering the 
constitutional question before trial. Defendants still could attempt to 
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dispose of a case before trial through a motion to dismiss or a motion 
for summary judgment based on the constitutionality of the defend-
ants’ actions.318 In fact, this is a more appropriate place for adjudi-
cating whether or not there was a constitutional violation before trial. 
Qualified immunity currently confuses the rules of civil procedure.319 A 
case should be dismissed before trial on a constitutional question only 
if a reasonable jury could not find for the plaintiff.320 Removing the 
constitutional question will allow courts to adjudicate the constitu-
tional question appropriately by forcing defendants to use the proper 
channels of civil procedure. 
2. The Three-Pronged Balancing Test 
The three-pronged balancing test would ask three questions that 
would be balanced to decide whether an officer is immune: (1) 
whether the plaintiff has pled enough facts to prove malice, (2) 
whether a reasonable officer would engage in the same conduct, and 
(3) whether allowing the case to proceed to trial “will be ‘beneficial’ in 
‘develop[ing] constitutional precedent.’”321 Each question will be ex-
plained in the following sections. 
a. Reincorporating Pre-Harlow Subjectivity 
The first factor will ask the court to examine whether the plaintiff 
pled enough facts to prove malice. The lack of subjectivity in Harlow 
creates situations where an officer can have apparent or obvious bad 
intent but still escape liability because the law is unclear. Qualified 
immunity is not intended to protect these officers; it is supposed to 
protect officers using appropriate discretion. Bad intent is inherently 
not an appropriate use of discretion. Therefore, the pre-Harlow test 
correctly emphasized the importance of an intertwined subjective and 
objective narrative.322 
This prong is necessary in the context of Fourth Amendment 
qualified immunity for two reasons. First, officers perform a fast-
paced, dangerous job where they need to make decisions in a split sec-
ond. Because of how quickly they need to make decisions, it might be 
easier for emotions to get the best of proper judgment in particularly 
intense situations. Therefore, situations where this has occurred 
should not go overlooked, so that it may set a precedent and en-
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courage officers and police departments to ensure that their training 
minimizes this danger. Second, subjectivity is most needed in situ-
ations where the discretionary standard is broad and difficult to 
define.323 The Fourth Amendment standards are both: they rely on an 
officer’s reasonableness, and they are definable only in relation to 
facts. Abuse of that discretion is more likely and more dangerous in 
this standard because the abuse is easier to hide. 
b. Would a Reasonable Officer Engage in the Same Conduct? 
This prong asks the court to examine the reasonableness of the 
officer’s actions. It makes two significant changes: (1) it removes 
constitutionality from the reasonableness inquiry, and (2) it focuses on 
the officer’s actions as opposed to clearly established law. 
Removing constitutionality from the reasonableness inquiry is a 
necessary step for two reasons. First, removing the constitutional 
question requires shifting the whole analysis away from deciding the 
constitutionality of the officer’s actions in any way. Second, in order 
to eliminate double reasonableness, the objective standard needs to 
shift away from constitutionality entirely. 
Focusing on the officer’s conduct shifts the analysis away from 
clearly established law and the problems that come with it. The 
analysis is focused on what an officer did as opposed to comparing 
what the officer did to judicial precedent. This removes the problems 
inherent in searching for clearly established law.324 
This prong also creates a more realistic reasonableness standard 
than clearly established law. It will allow courts to look beyond case 
precedent in deciding the reasonableness of an officer’s actions. Courts 
would be able to look at factors that are more relevant in informing 
an officer’s actions, such as department policies. Using department 
policies grounds the reasonableness analysis in the reality of an 
officer’s job because they actually use these policies. This shift also 
better captures the goals of qualified immunity. Since qualified im-
munity aims to protect officials using reasonable discretion, it is best 
to judge that discretion by the policies actually informing it. Case law 
in the murky waters of the Fourth Amendment most likely do not in-
form most officer’s actions from day to day. It is complicated and not 
easy to apply to a fact pattern,325 especially in the split second given 
to an officer to make a life or death decision. Police-department poli-
cies, however, are made for officers to inform them on how to act in 
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any situation. Removing the standard from clearly established law 
and constitutionality allows the courts to refocus the analysis on fac-
tors that more directly inform officers’ actions. 
c. Whether Allowing the Case to Proceed to Trial “will be ‘beneficial’ in 
‘develop[ing] constitutional precedent’”326 
This standard asks courts to determine whether there is a need for 
constitutional development given the facts of the case. Though this in-
terest was not present in Harlow, the Court emphasized it in Saucier, 
and it did not go away. Pearson gives courts leeway to structure the 
analysis in a way to develop constitutional law. They structure this 
approach by deciding whether it “will be ‘beneficial’ in ‘develop[ing] 
constitutional precedent.’”327 
This standard also preserves the Supreme Court’s encouragement 
to explore the clarity of precedent. Case law could still be examined 
under the objective prong, but not with the same thoroughness as the 
clearly established law standard. Under this proposal, instead of ask-
ing whether the law is clearly established, courts would have to 
examine how clearly established the law is. The less clear the law is, 
the more beneficial it might be to allow the case to proceed to trial 
and resolve the case on the merits. The clearer the law is, the less the 
court should care about constitutional development in deciding 
whether to allow the case to proceed to the merits. 
This standard does not give courts inappropriate discretion. 
Judges would examine this question in the same fashion they examine 
whether a right is clearly established: look at precedent and decipher 
whether there are clear rules. This factor only reframes the analysis so 
that instead of deciding whether something is clearly established, 
courts would look at how clearly established the law is. 
Furthermore, asking judges to examine the need for constitutional 
development balances the concerns of the Saucier framework and the 
shortcomings of the current regime. The main critique of Saucier was 
that it ignored the doctrine of constitutional avoidance by deciding 
constitutional questions as dictum, leading to bad constitutional rul-
ings.328 But the current regime creates a cycle where constitutional 
violations go unaddressed.329 Asking courts to consider the clarity of 
constitutional law avoids the critiques of Saucier because the judge 
would no longer have to decide any constitutional question. It also ad-
dresses the problems of the current regime by asking judges to di-
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rectly examine how constitutional violations may or may not go 
unaddressed in similar situations. 
This prong is important for the Fourth Amendment. Fourth 
Amendment standards are vague, broad, and largely fact dependent. 
Because of this, under the current qualified-immunity standard, it is 
incredibly difficult to find clearly established law. There can be many 
unique fact patterns, making it difficult to find exactly matching pre-
cedent.330 This creates a situation where a right can never become 
clearly established because it was not clearly established in the first 
place.331 Encouraging judges to critically examine the landscape of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in relation to the current fact pat-
tern gives judges discretion to clearly establish the Fourth Amend-
ment, which hopefully will lead to fewer Fourth Amendment 
violations. 
3. Balancing the Factors 
After examining the three factors, courts would then balance 
them and decide whether the scales tip in favor of the government 
and a finding of immunity, or the plaintiff and proceeding to trial. It 
would be in the court’s discretion to determine how to weigh the 
factors, but the following situations illustrate how it could work. In 
situations where there is substantial evidence of malice, the first prong 
would weigh heavily in favor of proceeding to trial, and perhaps could 
even be dispositive on the immunity issue. When an officer’s conduct 
is obviously reasonable given departmental policies, no matter how 
underdeveloped the law is, the court should hold the officer immune. 
The final prong should never be dispositive, but it will be informative 
in situations between the extremes of subjectivity and objectivity. In 
fact, the gray area between the extremes is the exact reason why the 
final prong is important: it encourages courts to decide whether the 
gray area needs to be clarified. 
The case-by-case nature of this balancing is not in tension with 
Harlow’s emphasis on preventing over-deterrence.332 As discussed 
above, officers are not deterred by the threat of liability.333 Therefore, 
creating a more case-by-case balancing standard should have no effect 
on an officer’s conduct. 
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IV. Comparison to Other Proposals 
This section will compare the three-factor balancing test to three 
other proposed solutions to qualified immunity. 
A. Changing the Standard to a Rule 
Alan Chen argues that qualified immunity should be converted 
from a standard to a rule under which officials either are absolutely 
immune or must defend the merits.334 This argument is largely based 
on the premise that courts engage in balancing when faced with 
qualified-immunity claims. He argues that any standard involving a 
reasonableness inquiry is necessarily a balancing test because it is 
“open-ended.”335 The case-by-case reasonableness inquiry of Harlow 
“grants courts greater discretion in balancing the importance of 
enforcing a constitutional right against the value of efficient function-
ing of government.”336 Chen argues that a rule-based immunity creates 
several benefits. First, it eliminates the distortion of the underlying 
constitutional standard.337 Second, it “promote[s] the advancement of 
substantive constitutional law by permitting adjudication of 
substantive, rather than procedural, issues.”338 Third, a rule-based 
immunity facilitates more development of substantive constitutional 
law.339 Finally, rule-based immunity creates more public interest in 
immunity issues.340 The rule could be based on a number of different 
variables. It could be based on the types of officials,341 the officials’ 
subjective belief in the lawfulness of their conduct, perhaps based on 
whether they were lawfully authorized,342 or a hybrid of different 
variables.343 
This proposal certainly appeals to a desire to abolish qualified 
immunity. It is unjust for officials who violate someone’s constitu-
tional rights to be immune simply because the right at issue was not 
clearly established when the violation occurred. Chen’s proposal also 
would promote the advancement of constitutional law, which could 
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put officials more on notice of their actions, which in turn could lead 
to fewer inadvertent constitutional violations. 
However appealing this proposal may be, the Supreme Court has 
absolutely refused to back down from the principles of qualified im-
munity. The Court repeatedly has stated that officials should be held 
to a reasonableness standard in order to protect both the govern-
ment’s interests and the public’s interests.344 Therefore, though desir-
able, Chen’s proposal seems impracticable at this point. 
Chen’s analysis is also based on a faulty assumption about how 
the qualified-immunity doctrine functions. Though Chen argues that 
qualified immunity requires case-by-case balancing, qualified immu-
nity functions more like a checklist than a balancing act. Unless 
courts can answer both the constitutional and qualified-immunity 
questions in the affirmative, the case cannot proceed. Unless courts 
can find factually similar precedent, a right was not clearly estab-
lished. Though courts have discretion in interpreting whether a right 
was violated and the relatedness of precedent, the actual functioning 
of qualified immunity relies less on open-ended reasonableness than a 
regimented scheme. There is less wiggle room for policy balancing 
than Chen de-scribes. Harlow itself is the result of a balancing of 
interests, but that balancing created a scheme that courts must 
adhere to, not a scheme that lets courts balance those same Harlow 
interests from case to case. 
The three-factor proposal takes away the checklist aspect of 
qualified immunity and converts it back to a balancing of interests, 
which is what gives it an advantage over Chen’s proposal. Qualified 
immunity is supposed to represent a compromise between public in-
terests and government interests,345 but it is currently more similar to 
the kind of bright-line rule Chen advocates. Chen’s proposal takes 
away any kind of interest balancing, when what is needed is a fairer 
interest balancing. 
Chen might take particular issue with the constitutional-
development factor of the three-factor proposal. He might say that it 
grants courts more of the kind of discretion he fears they have in the 
current qualified-immunity regime. But the constitutional-develop-
ment factor only reframes the discretion to change the balance. In the 
current qualified immunity regime, a right not being clearly estab-
lished weighs in the government’s favor.346 But in the three-factor 
proposal, a right not being clearly established weighs in the public’s 
favor. The constitutional-development factor removes the discretion 
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courts have to hide behind clearly established law as a reason to not 
address the merits. Therefore, the three-factor proposal better ad-
dresses the dangerous discretion given to courts by changing how it is 
weighed. 
B. “Clearly Unconstitutional”347 
John Jeffries argues that the “clearly established law” prong 
should be replaced with a “clearly unconstitutional” prong.348 Jeffries 
bases this argument on the idea that qualified immunity is no longer a 
reasonableness test; it is a recklessness or gross-negligence standard.349 
Though Harlow envisioned a reasonableness standard, the Court has 
significantly raised the bar.350 The principle of notice embedded in 
qualified immunity should be broader than merely factually similar 
precedent.351 An unreasonable constitutional violation is not suddenly 
reasonable because the Court has not previously said this is a vio-
lation.352 But these acts are outside of qualified immunity because the 
clearly established law prong is “hyper-technical and unbalanced.”353 
Therefore, Jeffries argues for a shift back to reasonableness.354 “Clearly 
unconstitutional” embodies this shift.355 It signals a less rigid and 
technical process of determining reasonableness.356 This signal leads to 
a broader idea of notice, not firmly planted in precedent.357 It moves 
the analysis away from precedent and more toward a “common social 
duty.”358 Outrageous conduct could now be deemed “clearly un-
constitutional,” whereas the outrageousness of the conduct is not 
important in the Harlow standard as currently interpreted.359 
Jeffries’s solution solves many of the Harlow standard’s problems. 
It frees qualified immunity from a search for factually similar pre-
cedent. It allows courts to look at the totality of the circumstances 
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informing an official’s conduct, which could allow the court to con-
sider the possibility of malice.360 It also better embodies the goals of 
Harlow: protecting officials using reasonable discretion. 
But Jeffries’s solution still leaves many of Harlow’s problems in-
tact. First, it does not address inappropriate judicial fact-finding.361 
Asking whether something is clearly unconstitutional is just as much 
a mixed question of law and fact as clearly established law.362 Courts 
still have to look at the facts from an officer’s perspective in order to 
decide how a reasonable officer would view them. Reasonableness, 
therefore, is necessarily a fact question, even if it is couched in more 
appropriate terms. This leads to the same problems created by 
Harlow’s inappropriate fact-finding.363 In fact, it is possible the clearly 
unconstitutional standard would lead to even more inappropriate fact-
finding, because comparing case facts to past cases is inherently 
simpler than looking at the totality of the circumstances to find a 
“common social duty.”364 Therefore, the necessary complexity and 
broader scope of Jeffries’s analysis asks for more fact-finding, making 
the fact-finding problem of Harlow worse. Second, in the context of 
the Fourth Amendment, Jeffries’s solution worsens the problems of 
double reasonableness.365 In a Fourth Amendment case, to decide 
whether something was clearly unconstitutional, a court would have 
to ask whether an officer’s conduct was clearly unreasonable.366 This 
makes the qualified-immunity question even more like the consti-
tutional question, since the court will be directly asking the 
constitutional question as opposed to asking whether an officer made 
a reasonable mistake about the law.367 Third, now that a court would 
directly be asking a constitutional question under the clearly unconsti-
tutional standard, this standard raises the typical standard at civil 
trials. Instead of a preponderance of the evidence standard, courts 
would be asking whether a right was clearly violated, which appears 
similar to a clear and convincing evidence standard.368 These remain-
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ing problems leave the scales of qualified immunity tipped heavily in 
favor of the government.369 
The three-factor proposal, on the other hand, has the same ben-
efits as clearly unconstitutional without the drawbacks. Like Jeffries’s 
standard, the three-factor proposal is not based on finding factually 
similar precedent, it allows an examination of all the circumstances, 
and it better protects the aims of Harlow. Unlike Jeffries’s proposal, it 
does address inappropriate judicial fact finding. By changing the 
terminology, courts will be able to interpret facts appropriately for the 
stage of the proceeding. Also, unlike Jeffries’s proposal, the double-
reasonableness problem is directly solved by the three-factor proposal. 
Jeffries’s standard preserves the constitutional standards, which is 
what creates many of qualified immunity’s problems. The three-factor 
proposal, by eliminating the constitutional question, eliminates the 
possibility for double reasonableness, and separates immunity from 
constitutionality. Finally, the three-factor proposal—unlike Jeffries’s 
proposal—does not raise the burden of proof for the constitutional 
question to clear and convincing because the court no longer is asking 
the constitutional question. 
C. Expanding the Definition of Clearly Established Law 
Avidan Cover proposes a specific solution for qualified immunity 
in the context of excessive-force claims: expanding the definition of 
clearly established law to include “statutes, regulations, and depart-
ment or agency policies applicable to the officer.”370 Cover’s pro-
position would not allow violations of use-of-force policies to “amount 
to a per se constitutional violation,”371 but rather, “[t]he policy would 
only inform the clearly established analysis.”372 This takes the analysis 
out of the abstraction of comparing case law and grounds it in the 
reality of police officers. It is more reasonable to expect officers “to be 
familiar with their own department[’s] use of force policies than all 
relevant or controlling circuit court opinions.”373 Cover states that it 
helps remove the qualified-immunity analysis from the search for 
specific fact patterns in precedent.374 He also states that this analysis 
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creates at least the same fair notice envisioned in Harlow.375 Therefore, 
the concerns of hardship on officers, embodied in Harlow, are not 
undercut by this standard when it holds officers accountable to 
standards with which they are more familiar.376 
Cover’s solution addresses several of the problems with qualified 
immunity for the Fourth Amendment specifically. Use-of-force policies 
begin to address the problem of double reasonableness. The policies 
will allow courts to move beyond abstractly figuring out whether a 
reasonable mistake was made and how to differentiate the two levels 
of reasonableness; the courts can now reference concrete policies and 
hold the officer’s conduct to those policies. Instead of evaluating the 
officer’s conduct through a double-reasonableness lens, the court can 
compare the officer’s conduct to their use-of-force policies. It is also a 
better standard for preventing over-deterrence of police conduct than 
the Harlow standard.377 Police officers are most likely more familiar 
with their department’s use-of-force policies than clearly established 
law. Knowing that their liability will be judged by these more familiar 
policies, officers would feel more confident in their actions. They 
would feel more capable of acting, which is what the Harlow Court 
wanted.378 
Cover’s solution, like Jeffries’s, still does not fully address the 
misbalanced scales of the Harlow standard. Like Jeffries’s standard, 
Cover’s solution does not solve the inappropriate fact-finding in quali-
fied immunity.379 It also creates a new issue: it may be possible for a 
court to grant qualified immunity to an officer who follows a use-of-
force policy, even if the use-of-force policy is unconstitutional. Cover 
responds that this actually benefits society as a whole, because munic-
ipalities can still be held liable for the unconstitutional policy and 
therefore be motivated to change them.380 While this certainly creates 
benefits down the line, it still creates a problem in suits against 
officers where unconstitutional conduct can go without a remedy 
because of a systemic problem. Unless the plaintiff also sues the mu-
nicipality, the systemic problem goes unaddressed. This does not 
promote efficiency by dismissing claims quickly, as envisioned by 
Harlow. Furthermore, a use-of-force policy could allow egregiously 
unconstitutional behavior—the same kind that Jeffries wanted to 
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capture381—and would then protect an officer’s egregiously 
unconstitutional behavior. 
The three-factor solution, on the other hand, does address the 
misbalanced scales of the Harlow standard. It, similar to Cover’s 
solution, will allow courts to look at police policies as a source of 
reasonableness, but it goes beyond just clearly established to take 
other factors into account. Cover’s solution does not address the 
possibility of an officer’s subjective intent, but the three-factor 
proposal weighs that evidence equally with other forms of reason-
ableness. Furthermore, the three-factor proposal can still find officers 
liable for following an unconstitutional policy because it considers 
more factors than just objective reasonableness. Overall, the three-
factor proposal is a more complete solution than Cover’s proposition. 
Conclusion 
The Harlow balance is off. There are many reasons why—even 
beyond those explored in this Note—but that conclusion is in-
escapable. Considering the thorough examination this Note gave to 
the development of qualified immunity and the issues associated, the 
impulse to simply abandon the doctrine is appealing. Abandoning the 
doctrine might look like a Chen-like approach to immunity, or, as has 
recently been posited, attacking the very legality of qualified immu-
nity itself.382 Unfortunately, these arguments have not changed, and 
most likely will not change, the minds of those who adhere to qual-
ified immunity. The Justices have too deeply entrenched themselves 
in the doctrine. 
Instead, the best response is a compromise, which is what the 
three-factor approach offers. The three-factor approach attempts to 
correct the Harlow misbalance while still taking into account the 
values the Justices value in qualified immunity. None of the factors 
adds a new value to the analysis; it is built on the idea that the cur-
rent Supreme Court will not change its mind on the existence of 
qualified immunity, and the best strategy for justice is to accept the 
terms of qualified immunity as provided and work from that point. 
Of course, the three-factor approach aims to do the one thing the 
Supreme Court has actively resisted: litigate more Fourth Amend-
ment cases on their merits. The values the Supreme Court has 
preached are valid, but they have been weighed incorrectly. Too much 
deference has been given to government officials in the interest of 
avoiding litigation. Because of this, too much unconstitutional con-
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duct goes unchecked. In order to correct the misbalance, the solution 
will necessarily result in more litigation. People like Jaime Lockard, 
the Creightons, and Israel Leija, Jr.’s family should not have the 
doors of justice closed on them before being heard. Their arguments 
deserve more consideration than simply being compared to obscure 
legal precedent. Hopefully, the three-factor approach can help open 
these doors. 
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